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Productivity in the U S .  
Automobile Industry 
IN THE LATE 1970s and 1980s intensified international competition in 
motor vehicle manufacturing and sales was reflected by an increase in 
the share of the American market captured by imports.' Some analysts 
argued that this increase reflected the low productivity of American 
automobile producers compared with that of Japanese and other foreign 
companies. Inflexible work rules or the adversarial nature of labor- 
management relations was often blamed.2 
Financial support for this research was provided by the International Motor Vehicle 
program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
1 .  Imports rose from 15.2 percent of passenger car sales in the United States in 1970 
to 28.3 percent in 1986; Ward's Automotive Yearbook (Detroit: Ward's Communication, 
1971), p. 57; (1987), p. 194. 
2. William J. Abernathy, Kim B. Clark, and Alan M. Kantrow estimated that U.S. 
automakers required 1.61 times the labor used by Japanese firms to produce a small car in 
1981; see Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Compefitive Future for America (Basic 
Books, 1983), p. 61. Using data from the level of the individual firm to estimate a 
multiproduct cost function and factor demand equations, Clifford Winston and others 
found Japanese labor 1.36 times more productive than American labor in automobile 
production; see Blindlntersection?Policy andthe AutomobileIndustry (Brookings, 1987), 
p. 16. Also see Alan Altshuler and others, The Future of the Automobile (MIT Press, 
1984). J. R. Norsworthy and Craig A. Zabala estimated that U.S. auto companies lost 
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The managements of the American auto companies apparently ac- 
cepted the proposition that industrial relations practices on the shop 
floor contributed significantly to their competitive problems. In the 1980s 
they argued that better practices were necessary to avoid layoffs and 
further erosions in market share.3 Often their arguments led to changes 
in industrial relations that gave managements greater discretion in 
allocating workers (and lessened the power of formal negotiated rules), 
increased the pace of work, and attempted to facilitate greater coopera- 
tion between muagement and the work force.4 These new work rules 
and the pay concessions that often accompanied them received wide 
attention in the press, in part because the auto industry had been the 
pacesetter in collective bargaining since World War II.S 
American management generally focused its efforts to improve shop 
floor practices on reducing the number ofjob classifications, hoping that 
such reductions would lead to lower costs. In a number of plants they 
pressed for the introduction of team systems of work organization and a 
lessening of the importance of seniority rights in intraplant transfers and 
 promotion^.^ 
The auto industry's efforts to improve competitiveness by changing 
industrial relations practices likely will continue as a result of new 
between $2 billion and $5 billion in profits in the 1970s because of poor industrial relations; 
see "Worker Attitudes, Worker Behavior, and Productivity in the American Automobile 
Industry, 1959-1976," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 38 (July 1985), pp. 
544-57. Also see Harry C. Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S .  
Automobile Industry (MIT Press, 1985); and Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The 
Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity (Basic Books, 1984). 
3. Katz, Shifring Gears, pp. 49-72. 
4. Wage settlements also reflected the effects of more intense foreign competition. In 
national contracts after 1980 the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) negotiated wage increases with 
Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford that were smaller than the 3 percent annual improve- 
ment factor plus cost-of-living increases common in contracts from 1948 through 1979. 
These pay concessions were accompanied by the introduction of profit-sharing and job 
security programs. 
5. For example, the automobile industry was the first major American industry to have 
cost-of-living adjustment escalators in a collective bargaining agreement. The industry 
also iiltroduced supplementary unemployment benefits and "30 and out" retirement 
systems. Industrial relations in the auto industry since World War I1 are described in Katz, 
Shifting Gears. 
6. Problems associated with the use of team systems are described in Katz, Shifting 
Gears, pp. 73-104. 
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companywide collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the fall of 
1987 between the UAW and General Motors and Ford.7 These agree- 
ments included guarantees providing that workers can be laid off only 
because of decreases in auto sales and not because of technological 
changes, outsourcing, negotiated improvements in productivity, or 
corporate reorganizations. In return the UAW agreed to the establish- 
ment of plant-level committees to examine ways for using team concepts 
more fully and altering work practices to improve productivity and 
product quality. These committees are to report back to corporate 
management regarding jointly accepted changes in work rules. Mean- 
while, Chrysler and the UAW have negotiated a number of plant-level 
agreements that introduce teamwork and decrease the number of job 
 classification^.^ 
While the companies are clearly counting on changes in industrial 
relations to improve their competitiveness, the economic effects of shop 
floor practices are not clear. Are numerous job classifications to blame 
for poor plant performance? Have the recent changes in work rules 
adopted in some plants produced significant results, and if so, which 
produced the greatest improvements? In particular, given the focus of 
management's efforts to introduce work teams, do such systems lead to 
improved productivity or product quality, and how significant are the 
improvements? 
There is no systematic evidence for evaluating the effects of shop 
floor industrial relations practices on economic pe~formance.~ Research 
7. These agreements are described in "Summary of Autoworkers' Settlement with 
Ford Motor Company as Presented to UAW Executive Council Sept. 18," Daily Labor 
Report, September 23, 1987; and "UAW, GM Pact Includes Wage Hike, Job Security 
Patterned After Ford," Daily Labor Report, October 13, 1987. 
8. See John Bussey, "UAW Learns 'Innovative' Labor Pacts Can Run Into Rank- 
and-File Resistance," Wall Street Journal, September 5, 1986. 
9. Research has looked at how industrial relations performance indicators such as 
absentee or grievance rates affect economic performance, but these studies have not 
measured the impact of work rules and work practices on economic performance. See, for 
example, Harry C. Katz, Thomas A. Kochan, and Kenneth R. Gobeitle, "Industrial 
Relations Performance, Economic Performance and QWL Programs: An Interplant 
Analysis," Industrial andLabor Relations Review, vol. 37 (October 1983), pp. 3-17; John 
H. Pencavel, "Analysis of an Index of Industrial Morale," British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol. 12 (March 1974), pp. 48-55; and Casey Ichniowski, "The Effects of 
Grievance Activity on Productivity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 40 
(October 1986). pp. 75-89. 
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has so far been limited by the lack of consistent measures for the practices 
and the economic performance of a large sample of plants. To remedy 
this deficiency, we surveyed work practices in the plants of one of the 
major American auto companies. The survey was carried out with the 
cooperation of company executives and union officials, but for proprie- 
tary reasons we cannot reveal the name of the company. The survey 
irrcluded measures of work rules and the extent of worker participation 
in shop floor decisions in 1979 and 1986. We used the survey data and 
corporate measures of product quality and plant productivity to analyze 
the effects of industrial relations practices on plant economic perfor- 
mance . 
The issue that motivated our analysis is the extent and nature of the 
contribution of industrial relations to the competitive position of Amer- 
ican auto companies. To assess that issue, policymakers need to know 
how American productivity compares with that in foreign auto plants 
and in plants operating in the United States that are owned by Japanese 
auto companies (the so-called transplants). Comparative company and 
country dataalso are necessary to identify the extent to which differences 
in industrial relations practices explain productivity differences. 
To address these issues, we analyzed data collected by John Krafcik 
on labor productivity in auto plants in a variety of countries. The data 
were particularly useful because they compared the productivity in union 
and nonunion plants in the United States and the performance of the 
domestically owned plants and the transplants. 
Our analysis adds the effects of the industrial relations system to a 
standard economic production function analysis. We assumed that 
production is a function of industrial relations practices in the plants as 
well as of capital and labor. We hypothesized that industrial relations 
affect economic performance primarily through two channels: discretion 
exercised by management and the level of cooperation between manage- 
ment and labor.I0 We expected plant economic performance to be better 
the greater the degree of discretion exercised by management in the 
allocation and pace of work and the greater the extent of labor-manage- 
ment cooperation. 
10. This model is described more fully in Thomas A.  Kochan, Harry C.  Katz, and 
Robert B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Relations (Basic Books, 
1986). pp. 81-108. 
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Plant Data 
We first analyzed data collected from fifty-three plants of a major 
American automobile manufacturer. The data were annual measures 
from each plant for 1979 and 1986 (five of the plants were not operating 
in 1979). Some plants are in Canada. In 1979 national collective bargain- 
ing agreements negotiated between each auto company and the UAW 
covered all plants in each country. In 1986 the Canadian plants were 
covered by an agreement between the company and the National 
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Canada 
(CAW); the plants in the United States were covered by an agreement 
with the UAW." In 1979 and 1986 each plant also had a separate 
agreement with its local UAW or CAW affiliate. Most of the plants 
engaged in the final assembly of vehicles, but the sample also included 
stamping, body fabrication, engine assembly, and auto parts plants. We 
chose 1979 for the initial observation because this was the last year 
before this and other American auto companies faced sharp deteriora- 
tions in sales (which lasted until 1983). Missing data reduced the sample 
in some of the analyses. 
Measures of the Plant Industrial Relations System 
To measure the discretion exercised by management and the level of 
labor-management cooperation, we surveyed the chief industrial rela- 
tions manager in each plant.12 The survey included twenty-three ques- 
tions concerning managerial discretion and the pace of work-amount 
of relief and idle time; procedures used to allocate work hours, job 
11. The CAW seceded from the UAW in early 1985; however, the secession, per se, 
did not lead to significant changes in the work practices in Canadian plants. The secession 
is discussed in Harry C. Katz, "New Developments in Union Structure in the U.S. Auto 
Industry," in Barbara D. Dennis, ed., Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting of 
the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1986 (Madison, Wisc.: IRRA, 1987), 
pp. 112-20. 
12. The development of the work practice survey involved extensive consultation with 
a group of experienced industrial relations managers from the company. We are grateful 
for their assistance. 
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transfers, layoffs, and recalls from layoff (including the role of seniority 
in those policies); number of job classifications for production, non- 
skilled (nonproduction), or skilled trades workers; and other work 
organization issues (see questions 1-23 in appendix B). 
We scored these questions so that management clearly would prefer 
a numerically higher score while the work force would prefer a lower 
one-a higher score indicated either a faster pace of work or greater 
discretion exercised by management in the allocation of job tasks (and 
typically a less important role for seniority rights). Thus by aggregating 
the scores we could infer the extent to which work rules and work 
practices favored management. It should be kept in mind that the plants 
varied widely in the degree to which they included team systems, which 
have few formal job classifications and relatively broad definitions for 
production jobs. 
Our previous field work in auto plants had indicated that labor- 
management cooperation was greater when workers and union officers 
participated more extensively in decisions that affected the plant and 
the production process. In this survey we thus assessed the extent of 
worker and union participation with twenty-five additional questions on 
the extent to which the hourly work force or union representatives 
participated in decisions involving the implementation of new technology 
on the shop floor, received information on costs and quality in their work 
area, used statistical quality control techniques, or participated in hiring, 
overtime scheduling, and training decisions (see questions 24-48 in 
appendix B). 
Corporate records of the number of written grievances per one- 
hundred hourly workers constituted an additional indicator of labor- 
management cooperation. We expected that where grievances were 
fewer, the extent of cooperation would be greater. We also used the 
absentee rate in each plant as an indicator, expecting high rates to 
indicate poor worker morale and poor cooperation. The data included 
the percent of the hourly work force absent for unexcused reasons- 
what the company called controllable absenteeism-from corporate 
records. Excused absences included such things as illness or jury duty. 
Recently, various theories have proposed that worker effort should 
be related to the cost ofjob loss. Where workers have more to lose from 
being fired for poor performance or by being laid off because of a plant 
closing, they should shirk less and cooperate more extensively with 
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management.13 Thus these models have predicted that where the labor 
market provides more attractive alternatives, on-the-job performance 
should be poorer. Between 1979 and 1986 this company, like other 
American auto manufacturers, was closing plants to reduce excess 
production capacity. The possibility that a plant with poor productivity 
would be closed was consequently not an idle threat. We therefore tested 
the efficiency-wage prediction with measures of the attractiveness of 
the labor market alternatives available to each plant's work force. A 
wage differential between the plant and the local labor market was 
calculated by dividing the average hourly wage in each plant by the 
average wage received by production workers in the plant's labor market 
area. The unemployment rate in the SMSA in which each plant was 
located was used as another indicator of the attractiveness of labor 
market alternatives.I4 
Reducing the Dimensionality of the Responses 
Before we could use a regression analysis of the data, we had to 
resolve the following problem. The number of measures of managerial 
discretion and labor-management cooperation yielded by the survey was 
too large to handle within a regression framework. Efforts to identify a 
meaningful subset of variables were plagued by multicollinearity among 
many of the most important ones. To solve this problem, we reduced 
the number of variables by using a confirmatory principal components 
regression analysis. We divided the forty-eight survey questions into 
those aimed at capturing the extent of managerial discretion (1-23) and 
those designed to assess worker and union participation (24-28). We 
then made a qualitative determination about (that is, we signed) each 
variable in the two subsets and applied principal components to each 
13. Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker 
Discipline Device," American Economic Review, vol. 74 (June 1984), pp. 433-44. 
14. The average wage for production workers in the local labor market area was taken 
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, vol. 27 (May 1980), 
table A-2, and vol. 34 (May 1987), table A-2. Unemployment rates are from U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President (Government 
Printing Office, 1980), table D-8; and Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings, vol. 34 (May 1987), table A-3. 
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(appendix A describes the statistical properties of principal components 
analysis). 
The major principal components that were derived from analysis of 
the responses confirmed our predictions about the way each issue 
influenced managerial discretion and worker participation. All significant 
component coefficients were signed in the predicted direction. In this 
sense the method was confirmatory, not exploratory. Also, the first two 
components produced by each subset were readily interpretable when 
we focused on the significant component loadings (those questions with 
coefficients greater than -45). These loadings divided by the component's 
eigenvalue were used to weight the standardized variables. The variables 
were then summed to form indices for each plant that were later used in 
the regressions. 
We retained the first two components generated by the application of 
principal components to questions 1-23.15 The signs of the component 
loadings on the individual questions were in the predicted direction. For 
example, the percentage of production workers expected to learn differ- 
ent jobs within their work area (question 10) had a positive sign (more 
favorable to management). Furthermore, these two components ap- 
peared to identify two very different types of work-rule policies. The 
questions withcomponent loadingsgreater than .45 in the first component 
(Teams) measured rules associated with team work systems. For ex- 
ample, the percent of hourly workers paid for the number of jobs they 
performed rather than for the specific job on a given day (question 9) 
was a key indicator of the use of work teams and had a coefficient of .63 
in the first management discretion component. Table A-1 in appendix A 
lists the signs and coefficients on those questions in the two managerial 
discretion components with coefficients greater than .45. The questions 
in the second managerial discretion component (Mandis) with weights 
greater than .45, however, concerned the pace of work and aspects of 
managerial discretion unrelated to teamwork. For example, the per- 
15. These two components accounted for 39 percent of the common variation in the 
questions on management discretion. We experimented with three additional methodolo- 
gies to analyze management discretion and participation. We applied a principal factor 
method to questions 1-23, which was able to explain 35 percent of the common variance. 
We also standardized and summed the responses to the questions, using the predicted 
sign. Finally, we selected a subset of the responses and used the direct responses. The 
regressions did not vary with these different methodologies. 
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centage of workers that have a right to earned idle time (question 3) had 
a coefficient of .59 in this component. 
A principal component analysis was similarly used to generate sum- 
mary measures of the responses to the questions on worker and union 
participation.16 Table A-1 also lists the signs and coefficients on the 
questions in the two participation components with coefficients greater 
than .45, using the responses from questions 24 through 48." Questions 
with weights greater than .45 in the first participationcomponent concern 
work group activities (Wrkgrppar), the extent to which information 
about costs and product quality was received on a regular basis by a 
plant's work groups, and the extent of worker involvement in group 
decisionmaking. For example, the percentage of employees with the 
responsibility to design, time, andlay outjobs in their workarea(question 
36) had a weight of .80 in the first participation component. 
The questions that weighed heavily in the second participation com- 
ponent (Techpar), in contrast, concerned the extent to which workers 
or union representatives were involved in the implementation of new 
technology on the shop floor (questions 24-27). 
Economic Performance Measures 
Our data included various indicators of the economic performance of 
each plant in 1979 and 1986. We used an annual plant average of a 
corporate quality index derived from a count of the number of faults and 
demerits that appeared in inspections of each plant's products.18 
The company keeps track of the hours of production workers' labor 
used to produce each vehicle in each plant, but the number of these 
16. The first two components explained 45 percent of the common variance in the 
responses. A principal factor analysis explained a higher level of the common variance 
(64 percent). We also validated our procedure by standardizing and summing the responses 
to the twenty-five participation questions, using the predicted sign. Finally, we selected a 
subset of participation questions and used the direct responses. Again, regardless of the 
method, the regressions yielded similar results. 
17. As with the managerial discretion components, the signs of the significant com- 
ponent coefficients on the individual participationquestions were in the expecteddirection, 
namely, more worker or union involvement was associated with a higher coefficient. 
18. This index can be criticized because it counts all faults equally and does not weight 
quality problems. It was also not clear that the corporate quality auditors focused on the 
quality problems perceived by customers. 
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hours is available for 1979 and 1986 only for final vehicle assembly 
plants. The company also generates a labor efficiency index for each 
assembly plant by dividing production worker hours by the standard 
number of hours each plant is expected to use to assemble the mix of 
vehicles it produces. The labor standards used in this index are generated 
by the company's industrial engineers and include considerations of 
variations in product complexity. We were not certain of the accuracy 
of the company's correction for product complexity in the computation 
of standard labor hours, so our analysis used both the raw number of 
labor hours and the adjusted labor hours. 
Our survey of plant work practices recorded the number of first-line 
supervisors and production workers in each plant. One of the frequent 
criticisms of management in American auto companies is that there are 
too many levels of management and too many managers (including 
supervisors) relative to production workers, especially when compared 
with Japanese auto companies.I9 We calculated the number of supervi- 
sors per production worker in each plant and expected that more efficient 
plants would have fewer supervisors per worker. There are, however, 
problems with using this ratio as an indicator of plant performance. 
Having fewer supervisors per worker does not necessarily indicate lower 
production costs. It may mean only that supervisory duties have been 
assigned to other managers or that supervision is being accomplished 
through other methods. Yet the number of supervisors should shed 
some light on plant performance, and it had two particular virtues in our 
study. In contrast to the measures of hours worked, this number was 
available for nearly all the plants for 1979 and 1986. Furthermore, the 
number of supervisors per production worker was generated by the 
survey; it was not part of the company's normal accounting system, 
from which we acquired our other measures. Our experience with 
corporate accounting controls suggests that plant managers may some- 
times make the numbers lookgood while not necessarily improving plant 
performance. An indicator of plant performance that does not come 
from corporate accounting controls may avoid some of the biases that 
appear in the other measures of plant performance. 
19. This criticism is made in Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, 
for example. 
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Diversity among Plants 
Table 1 reflects the diverse quality of the industrial relations and 
economic performance of the plants sampled. Despite the common 
employer and the national collective bargaining agreements, the plants 
show a wide diversity in labor hours per vehicle, product quality, and 
grievance and absentee rates. In 1986, for example, grievances per one- 
hundred workers varied from alow of 1.3 in one plant to 158.5 in another. 
The absentee rate varied between 1.1 and 4.2 percent of the work force 
on average throughout the year, the product quality index ranged from 
119 to 143, and production worker hours required to assemble a car 
ranged from 21.2 to 43.1. Even after adjusting the labor hours for labor 
standards, one plant used 6 percent more hours than the standard to 
assemble its product mix while another used 32 percent more. The 
number of supervisors varied from 1.8 per one-hundred production 
workers in one plant to 20 in another.20 
The variation among plants in the extent of managerial discretion and 
worker participation was also extensive. For example, in 1986 the 
number ofjob classifications for production workers ranged from 1 to as 
high as 155. The percentage of the work force that discussed with 
management how new technology would affect job duties (question 26) 
ranged from 0 in some plants to 100 percent in others. 
What is the source of this variation? Are we observing different but 
nonetheless equally efficient industrial relations practices among plants? 
If not, why do different practices persist? Our field observations in these 
plants suggested that the variation in the amount of discretion exercised 
by management and the pace of work arises and persists as aconsequence 
of differences in the bargaining power held by workers and their local 
unions.21 Workers and the UAW locals generally prefer more limited 
management discretion in allocating work and regulating its pace. Yet 
the extent of worker and union bargaining power varies (and has varied) 
20. This variation was not narrowed significantly when we controlled for differences 
in plant type or separated the plants into Canadian and U.S. subsamples. Nor was the 
variation in labor hours eliminated when plants in start-up phases were excluded. This 
diversity was similar to that found in Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille, "Industrial Relations 
Performance." 
21. See Katz, Shifring Gears, pp. 13-48. 
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Table 1. Memures of Industrial Relations and Economic Performance, 1979 and 1986 
Standard 
Mean Minimum Muximurn deviution 
Measurea 1979 1986 1979 1986 1979 1986 1979 1986 
Absentee rate 
(percent) 6.01 2.56 2.40 1.10 9.20 4.20 1.62 0.86 
Grievance rate 
(per 100 workers) 62.75 27.37 2.33 1.28 450.20 158.50 77.66 29.92 
Labor hours per 
vehicle 28.82 32.73 20.10 21.20 41.30h 43.10b 4.88 12.32 
Adjusted labor 
hours 1.15 1.20 0.96 1.06 1.43b 1.32h 0.15 0.15 
Product quality 
index 128.50 132.89 115.00 119.00 145.00 143.00 6.42 6.03 
Supervisors (per 100 
production workers) 7.94 7.70 3.0 1.81 24.4 20.26 4.67 4.84 
Source: Authors' calculations from sample data. 
a. The number of observations for each variable In 1979 are absentee rate (39). grievance rate (45). labor hours 
(19), adjusted labor hours (19), product quality (40), and supervisors (46). The number of observations in 1986 are 
absentee rate (35), grievance rate (49). labor hours (19). adjusted labor hours (19). product quality (441, and supervisors 
151) ,~~ . 
b. Excludes consideration of plants in the midst of product start-up 
substantially among plants. Where workers and union have significant 
bargaining power they win and defend work practices to their advantage. 
Management is limited in its ability to shift production out of plants 
where unions are strong and is sometimes not interested in doing so 
because of the plants' locations or other economic advantages. 
Variations in discretion exercised also derive from recent efforts by 
American management to change work organization radically by intro- 
ducing team-oriented work systems. The goal of introducing team 
systems is to lower costs and increase production flexibility by broad- 
ening worker tasks and decentralizing decisionmaking. These systems 
typically involve fewer job classifications and fewer rules governing 
worker movements and responsibilities as rulemaking becomes less the 
province of formal negotiations and more the responsibility of the teams 
themselves. Yet in some plants the introduction of team systems has 
been slowed by resistance from workers, unions, or management and 
by implementation problems.22 Consequently, the use of the systems 
varied extensively among plants in the data set. 
22. Louise Kertesz, " 'Progressive' Work Pacts Split UAW; Lasting Anger Is Feared," 
Automotive News, April 6, 1987; Bussey, "UAW Learns 'Innovative' Labor Pacts Can 
Run Into Rank-and-File Resistance": and Katz, Shifring Gears, pp. 73-104. 
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The degree of worker and union cooperation with management also 
differed substantially. Some plants were characterized by bitter adver- 
sarial relations, while in others unions and workers participated exten- 
sively in business and production decisions. This variation was due in 
part to differences in worker and management attitudes in the company 
and to differences in bargaining leverage that influenced the degree to 
which either party could enforce its  preference^.^^ Workers and local 
unions varied widely, for instance, in how much they were ideologically 
opposed to management and to efforts to improve plant performance. 
Although the UAW and the company management have tried to initiate 
various worker participation and labor-management programs in the 
past fifteen years, the spread and depth of these programs continues to 
vary substantially among plants and to contribute to significant differ- 
ences in the levels of labor-management cooperation. 
Regression Analysis of Company Data 
To what extent is the variation in economic performance apparent in 
table 1 caused by variations in the plants' industrial relations practices? 
We used the following equation to test our hypotheses: 
(1) Xi,, = K + a, Teamsi,, + a2 M a n d i ~ , , ~  + a, Wrkgrppar,,, 
+ cx4 Techpari., + ( Y ~ W ~ , ~  + a6Ui,, + a7Ai, ,  + C X ~ G ~ , ~  
+ a$i,r + a10Si.r + ei.1. 
Here, X is a measure of plant i's economic performance in year t (1986 
or 1979). X is measured by the quality index, labor hours per vehicle, 
adjusted labor hours, or the number of supervisors per production 
worker. Teams is the score on the team-related principal component in 
plant i in year t .  Mandis is the extent of managerial discretion and the 
pace of work, Wrkgrppar is the extent of worker and union participation 
in work group decisions, and Techpar is the extent of worker and union 
participation in new technology. W is the ratio of plant i's wage to the 
average wage in the local labor market, U is the unemployment rate in 
the local labor market, A is the absentee rate, and G is the grievance 
23. See Katz, Shifting Gears, pp. 73-104; and Katz,"Policy Debates Over Work 
Reorganization in North American Unions," in Richard Hyman and Wolfgang Streeck, 
eds., New Technology and industrial Relations (Basil Blackwell, forthcoming). 
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Table 2. Logit Mimation Reipults with Number of Supervisors per Production Worker 
as Dependent Variablea 
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Constant - 3.795Sb -2.8919b -2.7497b -2.5802" -3.1103b 
(0.5647) (0.1123) (0.1 196) (0.2407) (0.3576) 
Teams 0.0399 0.1204 . . .  . . .  . . .  
(0.0942) (0.0741) 
. . .  Mandis -0.3906" -0.3343b . . .  . . .  
(0.0811) (0.0709) 
. . .  Wrkgrppur -0.0602 -0.0967 -0.0300 . . .  
(0.6886) (0.0717) (0.0624) 
Techpar -0.0889 -0.0617 -0.1449' . . .  . . .  
(0.0699) (0.0566) (0.0597) 
. . .  Absentee 0.0318 . . .  -0.0043 . . .  
(0.0370) (0.0360) 
Grievance -0.0005 . . .  . . .  - 0.0003 . . .  
(0.0009) (0.0010) 
. . .  Wagediff 1.2453 . . .  . . .  0.803Y 
(0.4814) (0.3282) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Unemployment 0.0677 0.0480 
(0.0508) (0.0400) 
Sfart-up -0.1887 -0.3539 -0.43306 -0.5995' -0.5331' 
(0.2560) (0.2203) (0.2347) (0.2855) (0.2234) 
Assemblye 0.5392h 0.4408b 0.0801 0.0210 0.0092 
(0.1880) (0.1483) (0.1412) (0.1914) (0.1493) 
Bodye 0.2386 0.41Wb 0.5487" 0.4765' 0.3773' 
(0.2061) (0.1543) (0.1678) (0.2249) (0.1784) 
- 
R' 
Number 
p~~ - -- 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
c. Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test. 
d. Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, two-tailed test. 
e. The excluded category of plants was engine and other parts plants. 
rate. D represents dummy variables for the type of plant,24 and S is a 
dummy variable of value 1 if the plant is in the midst of starting up 
production of a new product in year t. 
Regression Results 
Tables 2 through 5 report the results of the regression estimates of 
equation 1 with various measures of plant economic performance as 
24. Plant types are final assembly (Assembly), stamping and fabrication (Body), and 
engine and other (various parts plants). 
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Table 3. Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with Labor Hours 
as Dependent Variable 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 33.4939b 33.4335b 28.5%9b 28.6001b 17.851Sb 
(6.3870) (3.3482) (1.4986) (2.0636) (5.9878) 
. . .  . . .  Teams 4.473SC 6.6067b . . .  
(1.7779) (2.0511) 
. . .  Mandis -4.9089 -3.8741 . . .  . . .  
(1 3949) (3.2326) 
. . .  . . .  Wrkgrppar -3.2317 -4.9735' 0.5640 
(1.91 16) (2.2594) (1.4277) 
Techpar -1.1206 -1.3167 -0.5996 . . .  . . .  
(0.8136) (1.2668) (1.4202) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Absentee -0.0154 - 0.0740 
(0.5543) , (0.4876) 
. . .  Grievance 0.0059 . . .  . . .  0.0076 
(0.0104) (0.0107) 
Wagediff 5.4869 . . .  . . .  . . .  4.0431 
(5.0891) (7.5013) 
Unemployment - 0.2362 . . .  . . .  . . .  1.6757' 
(0.7135) (0.8198) 
Start-up 7.2883~ 10.6669 18.9771C 9.1717b 16.1904b 
(2.9542) (4.5607) (3 .%95) (2.6492) (4.0549) 
- 
R2 
Number 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
c. Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test. 
the dependent variables. Equations for tables 3 to 5, with labor 
hours, adjusted labor hours, and product quality, were estimated using 
weighted least squares, with plant employment used as the weights 
to avoid heteroskedastic errors. 
Since the level of supervision is measured as a percentage of the work 
force, with a restricted range between 0 and 1, ordinary least squares is 
an inefficient and potentially biased estimator when the ratio of super- 
visors to production workers is the dependent variable. Instead, to 
estimate the equations listed in table 2, we used a logit for grouped data, 
applying weighted least squares to correct for hetero~kedasticity.2~ The 
level of supervision was measured as the ratio of first-line supervisors to 
25. See G. S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics 
(Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 29-30; and Marc Nerlove and S. J.  Press, 
Univariate and Multivariate Log-Linear and Logistic Models (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand 
Corporation, 1973). 
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Table 4. Weighted Leest Squares EsHrnation Results with AdJusted Labor Hours 
as Dependent Variable" 
Variable ( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.9067b 1 .2586b 1. 1350' 1 .0510b 1. 1634b 
(0.1581) (0.0542) (0.0229) (0.0575) (0.1030) 
Teams 0.0073 0.0437 . . .  . . . . .  
(0.0440) (0.0332) 
Mandis -0.1619' -0.1262' . . .  . . .  . . .  
(0.0469) (0.0523) 
Wrkgrppar 0.0101 -0.0509 -0.0327 . . . . .  
(0.0473) (0.0366) (0.0218) 
Techpar -0.051@ -0.0462' -0.0536" . . .  . . .  
(0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0217) 
Absentee 0.03W . . .  . . 0.0147 . . .  
(0.0137) (0.0136) 
Grievance 0.0001 . . .  . . .  0.0003 . . .  
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Wagediff 0.1444 . . .  . . .  . . .  -0.1178 
(0.1260) (0.1290) 
. . .  Unemployment 0.03W . . .  . . .  0.0017 
(0.0177) (0.0141) 
Start-up O.390lb 0.249Y 0.2696' 0.32Mb 0.2169b 
(0.0731) (0.0738) (0.0606) (0.0739) (0.0697) 
- 
R2 
Number 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
c .  Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test. 
d. Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, two-tailed test. 
production workers in a plant. Using the ratio, the logit was written as 
the log-odds ratio of observing a supervisor on the shop floor.26 
In the face of the potential biases resulting from estimation of this 
reduced-form equation, tables 2 through 5 show the estimation results 
with various combinations of included independent variables. In column 
3 of tables 2 through 5 we report the estimation results with the 
26. The log odd is linearly conditioned on a set of explanatory variables, where 
In (p,ll - p,) = B'X + e. The p,'s are the proportion of supervisors in relation to all 
production workers, and are assumed to be mutually independent and drawn from a 
random binomial population. Since the error term is heteroskedastic, weighted least 
squares is the appropriate estimating procedure. The weight is constructed as follows: 
w, = n,p, (1 - p,), where w, is the weight for the ithobsewation, n, is the number of workers 
and supervisors in the ith plant, andp, is the proportion of supervisors in the ith plant. This 
weighted least squares estimator is known as the minimum logit chi-square method. 
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Table 5. Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with Quality 
as Dependent Variable 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 137.0787 138.2750b 137.7389b 139.6607b 131 .3656b 
(5.7065) (1.4398) (1.3790) (2.0753) (3.%16) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Teams 0.2744 0.5397 
(0.9306) (0.7881) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Mandis 1.4827 0.8870 
(0.9982) (0.9304) 
. . .  . . .  Wrkgrppar - 0.6508 0.2884 0.7040 
(0.8307) (0.7344) (0.5686) 
. . .  . . .  Techpar 0.3209 0.9945 1.10W 
(0.7335) (0.6536) (0.6278) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Absentee -0.7181' -0.6926d 
(0.3823) (0.3 116) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Grievance - 0.0072 - 0.0074 
(0.0096) (0.0092) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Wagediff 0.2889 2.6967 
(4.8898) (3.8247) 
. . .  . . .  . . .  Unemployment 0.4671 0.6321 
(0.5237) (0.4238) 
Start-up -5.6838d - 5.9794b - 5.0719b - 4.97506 -4.403Y 
(2.4138) (2.1707) (2.0312) (2.1019) (1.9678) 
Assembly' -9.2402b - 10.3455b -9.4156b -8.1271b -7.9258b 
(2.1403) (1.9058) (1.5466) (1.6772) (1.6998) 
Bodye - 1.%17 - 3.5087' - 3.7294' - 2.2547 -2.7855' 
(2.2507) (2.0008) (1.9745) (2.0910) (2.0158) 
- 
R2 
Number 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
c .  Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test. 
d. Statistically significant at the 0.10 level, two-tailed test. 
e .  The excluded category of plants was engine and other parts plants. 
participation indices as the only industrial relations measures in the 
equation. 27 
We focus here on the results where the number of supervisors and 
labor hours are used as dependent variables (tables 2 and 3), since the 
economic significance of the coefficient estimates in these equations is 
easier to interpret. More extensive use of teams (controlling for the level 
27. We do this because the principal component, Wrkgrppar, is highly correlated with 
the principal component Teams @ = 0.70), and hence the influence of Wrkgrppar may be 
confounded with the influence of Teams in the other estimated equations. 
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of worker participation), as indicated by a higher score for Teams, caused 
more supervisors and labor hours. In table 3, equation 2, the association 
between Teams and labor hours is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
Furthermore, the negative effects on productivity from the use of 
teams were sizable. The coefficients in equation 2 in tables 2 and 3 imply 
that a one-standard-deviation increase in Teams leads to 3.0 more 
supervisors per one-hundred workers in the plant and 7 hours and 28 
minutes more labor time required to assemble each car. 
The negative effect of the use of team systems on plant productivity 
did not appear to derive from their expanded use in plants that had low 
productivity due to some other (unmeasured) factors. Plants with rela- 
tively low labor hours in 1979 (or fewer supervisors) were slightly more 
likely to experience increases in the use of teams between 1979 and 1986. 
This is indicated by the fact that the simple Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the change in Teams from 1979 to 1986 with labor hours in 1979 
is - .16. The simple correlation between the change in Teams from 1979 
and 1986 and the number of supervisors in 1979 is - . 19.28 While neither 
correlation was statistically significant at conventional levels, the lack 
of significant positive correlations allowed us to reject the argument that 
teams were introduced more frequently in plants that were already 
performing poorly. 
Greater managerial discretion in interpreting work rules and a faster 
pace of work, as indicated by a higher score in Mandis, caused fewer 
supervisors and labor hours. In table 2, equation 2, the association 
between Mandis and the number of supervisors is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. The magnitudesof the effects of greater managerial 
discretion also are sizable. The coefficients in equation 2 in tables 2 and 
3 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in Mandis caused 8.5 
fewer supervisors per one-hundred workers and 1 hour and 49 minutes 
less to assemble a car. 
More extensive worker and union participation in decisionmaking 
(controlling for the extent of managerial discretion) also leads to fewer 
supervisors and labor hours. In equation 2, table 3, the association 
between Wrkgrppar and labor hours is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. However, the other associations between the participation 
28. The number of observations in these correlations was nineteen. 
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indices and the number of supervisors and labor hours in equation 2, 
tables 2 and 3, are not statistically significant. 
Although the statistical significance of the participation indices were 
weak, the estimated size of the effects suggested that these variables 
were important. The coefficients in equation 2, tables 2 and 3, imply that 
a one-standard-deviation increase in Wrkgrppar leads to 2.4 fewer 
supervisors per one-hundred workers and 4 hours and 41 minutes less 
time to assemble a car. A one-standard-deviation increase in Techpar 
causes 1.5 fewer supervisors and I hour and 25 minutes less time. 
In the equations reported in tables 4 and 5 the same patterns hold. 
More extensive use of teams generally caused higher adjusted labor 
hours and lower quality across the estimated equations, while greater 
managerial discretion and a faster work pace (higher values of Mandis) 
and more participation (higher values of Wrkgrppar and Techpar) 
generally caused fewer adjusted labor hours and higher quality. Not 
many of the coefficients on the principal components in the estimated 
equations reported in tables 4 and 5, however, were statistically signifi- 
cant at even the 10 percent level. 
Measures of the external labor market (the unemployment rate and 
the wage differential between the plant and the local labor market) did 
not affect plant economic performance in the hypothesized manner. In 
equations 1 and 5 in table 2, in fact, a higher plant wage relative to the 
wage in the local labor market led to more supervisors, not fewer as 
predicted by a "shirking" hypothesis of efficiency-wage theories, and 
the coefficient on the wage differential variable was statistically signifi- 
cant at the 5 percent level. In equation 5, table 3, a higher unemployment 
rate led to more labor hours, again a result opposite to that predicted by 
the shirking hypothesis, and the coefficient was statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. 
The equations reported in tables 2 through 5 provide little evidence 
that higher grievance rates led to lower plant productivity. Higher 
absentee rates were associated with lower product quality at the 10 
percent and 5 percent levels of statistical significance in equations 1 and 
4, table 5, and higher absentee rates were associated (at the 5 percent 
level) with more adjusted labor hours in equation 1,  table 4. 
The principal components analysis of the management discretion and 
worker participation questions may have missed or blurred the impor- 
tance of particular work practices. As an alternative to the principal 
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components analysis, we chose those survey questions (numbers 1, 10, 
17, 19, 21, 25, 31, 43, 48) that we thought concerned the most critical 
work practices, based on our knowledge of the auto production process, 
and entered the survey responses to them directly into equation 1 in 
place of the principal component indices. The results were consistent 
with the ones reported above. Responses indicating greater managerial 
discretion and faster work pace positively affected productivity and 
product quality. Responses indicating greater use of teams had either a 
negative effect or no effect on labor productivity and product quality. 
Greater worker participation, as reflected in higher scores for these 
responses, caused higher productivity (fewer labor hours) and better 
product quality. The number of production-worker job classifications, 
however, consistently had no statistically significant effect on either 
labor hours or product quality.29 This result was particularly striking in 
the face of the emphasis American management has put on reducing the 
number of these job classifications. 
To control for the influence that unmeasured plant-specific effects 
may have exerted in equation 1 ,  we estimated an equation using a 
measure of change in plant-level economic performance between 1979 
and 1986 as the dependent variable and measures of change in the 
industrial relations system as the independent variables. This was 
equivalent to estimating a fixed-effects model and assuming plant fixed 
effects were identical in 1979 and 1986. These equations were estimated 
with the change in either product quality or the number of supervisors 
per production worker as the dependent variable; our sample was too 
small to estimate such an equation with labor hours or adjusted labor 
hours as the dependent variable.30 In the estimated change equations 
none of the coefficients on the independent variables was statistically 
significant at even the 10 percent level." 
29. The number of craft worker job classifications did lead to fewer labor hours and 
fewer supervisors. The effect was statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the 
estimated equations with individual question responses entered as independent variables. 
It should be remembered that in the principal components analysis, the number of 
production-workerjob classifications loaded strongly on the Teams component, while the 
number of craft-worker job classifications loaded strongly on the Mandis component. 
30. In 1979 and 1986 a number of assembly plants were closed for model changeover. 
which contributed to the small sample for assembly plants. 
31. Equations with the change in product quality and change in the number of 
supervisors have thirty-seven and forty-six observations, respectively. The estimation 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Effects of Work Practices on Productivity among Firms 
The foregoing discussion has analyzed the contribution of industrial 
relations practices to the productivity among the plants of one American 
auto company. The data suggested that differences in such practices 
contribute significantly to differences in plant productivity. The data 
also showed that team systems of work organization in this firm did not 
yield positive results. We now turn to adata set that allows us to compare 
the labor productivity in this firm with that in a broad sample of U.S. 
and foreign auto plants. 
These comparative data were collected by John Krafcik as part of the 
International Motor Vehicle program at the Massachusetts Institute of 
T e c h n o l ~ g y . ~ ~  We first focus on what Krafcik's comparative data suggest 
regarding the extent of company and country auto productivity differ- 
entials and then discuss what these data imply for the role of industrial 
relations. 
Krafcik calculated the labor productivity in twenty-nine assembly 
plants owned by a variety of companies and operating in a number of 
countries. He calculated the number of hours of hourly and salaried 
labor used to accomplish a group of designated standard activities on a 
product standardized by size, option content, and weld requirements. 
The number of workers involved in assembly operations in each plant 
and the number of vehicles assembled were counted and then standard- 
ized across plants by adjusting for the complexity of the product and 
excluding labor hours used to perform nonstandard final assembly tasks. 
The exclusion essentially adjusted for differences in corporate structure 
and the degree of vertical integration in corporate assembly and related 
operations. Making these adjustments was difficult and required knowl- 
edge of plant operations acquired through visits and through familiarity 
with the automobile assembly process. 
Krafcik's calculations contrast with economists' traditional efforts to 
derive marginal production costs from a production function analysis. 
32. See John F. Krafcik, "High Performance Manufacturing: An International Study 
of Auto Assembly Practice," working paper (International Motor Vehicle program, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 1988). We are grateful to Krafcik and 
James Womack for allowing access to the data. Original access to the plants in this data 
set was provided with the condition that specific plants and companies not be identified. 
Our analysis benefits from the fact that we have visited some of these plants and observed 
their industrial relations practices. 
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In his procedure there are no controls for such things as differences in 
the quantity or quality of the capital stock used in assembly plants or 
differences in product design that might influence the ease with which 
workers can assemble the autos (what is referred to in the industry as 
product manufacturability). Furthermore, his productivity measures 
focused on the number of labor hours used to assemble a vehicle and 
ignored differences in rates of pay, capital costs, and the costs of other 
inputs. 
Krafcik derived labor productivity figures for five plants in Japan, 
thirteen in North America, and eleven in Europe. Of the North American 
plants, three were Japanese transplants and some were in Canada. 
Krafcik found that Japan averaged 20.3 labor hours per vehicle, North 
America 24.4, and Europe 33.9. The productivity differential of 20 
percent between U.S. and Japanese assembly plants was on the same 
scale as the 36 percent differential Clifford Winston derived from his 
econometric estimation of automobile industry cost functions. Earlier 
analyses had estimated a more substantial differential.33 
Do differences in industrial relations practices help explain why 
Japanese auto plants have higher prductivity? Japanese practices do 
differ significantly from those traditional in American and European 
man~facturing.3~ Japanese plants use few job classifications, encourage 
worker participation in production decisions on the shop floor, and link 
pay to workers' and firms' performance. Our field observations in 
Japanese auto plants concluded that these practices facilitated the 
operation of just-in-time inventory systems and the prevailing decen- 
tralized mode of decisionmaking. The plants seemed to link informal 
and decentralized industrial relations and work practices to highly 
effective manufacturing practices. 
Yet the lack of detailed data on these industrial relations practices 
33. See Winston and associates, Blindlntersectton, p. 16. Winston's estimate IS lower, 
for example, than that found in Abernathy, Clark, and Kantrow, Industrial Renaissance, 
p. 61. Krafcik's data also revealed substantial diversity in labor productivity among 
companies as well as among plants within particular companies in a country. For example, 
two domestically owned North American assembly plants had productivity figures below 
the Japanese average. Labor hours in the six North American assembly plants of one 
company ranged from 26.1 to 35.7 hours per vehicle in Krafcik's data set. 
34. See Yasuhiro Monden, Toyora Production System: Practical Approach to Pro- 
duction Management (Norcross, Ga.: Industrial Engineering and Management Press, 
1983); and Michael A. Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and 
Management at Nissan and Toyofa (Harvard University Press, 1985). 
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makes it impossible to know if or to what degree the higher Japanese 
productivity suggested in Krafcik's data is caused by greater managerial 
discretion (equivalent in our American company data set to higher scores 
of Mandis), more extensive use of team systems (equivalent to higher 
scores of Teams), greater worker and union participation in decision- 
making (equivalent to higher scores of Wrkgrppar and Techpar), or some 
other work practices. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that team systems 
appear to be an integral part of the Japanese auto production system. 
In the American company there was no positive advantage to using 
team systems, and in some cases the systems provided no increase in 
worker participation in shop floor decisionmaking. Is this a problem 
common to all U.S. auto plants? Krafcik's data set suggested that 
Japanese transplants may have avoided some of the problems plaguing 
the American auto company we analyzed. The three transplants in his 
data set showed significantly better labor productivity than the average 
American plants. And in an earlier paper he reported that as of the 
summer of 1986 the New United Motor Manufacturing (NUMMI) 
assembly plantjointly owned by General Motors and Toyota in Fremont, 
California, used only 8.2 percent more labor hours per vehicle than did 
its extremely high-performing sister plant (Takaoka) in Japan.35 
Do industrial relations practices contribute to the superior perfor- 
mance of the transplants? The transplants do use manufacturing and 
industrial relations practices that are similar, although not identical, to 
Japanese practices. The NUMMI plant, for example, uses work teams 
and has only four job classifications (one for production workers and 
three for skilled trades). Unlike the two other transplants, the plant is 
unionized (UAW). Unionization per se, however, does not appear 
critical. Krafcik's data showed that NUMMI's labor productivity was 
nearly identical to that of one of the unorganized transplants and 18.1 
percent higher than that of the other. It is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions with such limited data, but NUMMI's experience suggests 
that it is possible to operate with unionized labor and come very close to 
Japanese levels of p r o d ~ c t i v i t y . ~ ~  
35. Krafcik, "High Performance Manufacturing," p. 17; and Krafcik, "Learning from 
NUMMI," working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Motor 
Vehicle program, September 1986). 
36. Sinceall U .S. assembly plantsofGenera1 Motors, Ford, andchrysler areunionized, 
it is not possible to compare union and nonunion experiences. 
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Like their sister plants in Japan, the transplants do seem to have 
found a way to link team systems and informal industrial relations to 
decentralized andeffective manufacturingpra~tices.~~ Krafcik's analy sis 
of his data lends further support to this view: he found that an index of 
management policy measuring the use of team systems, dedicated repair 
space, visual control of the production process, and the absentee rate 
was a strong predictor of productivity and product quality.38 Nonethe- 
less, for the transplants as well as the Japanese plants, we do not yet 
have sufficient data to assess the contribution of specific shop floor 
practices as we did for the American auto company we analyzed. 
Summary and Policy Implications 
Much of the debate and conflict in American industrial relations in 
recent years has focused on changes in shop floor work practices. 
Confronted with intensified international competition, management and 
labor are searching for ways to lower costs and improve quality. 
Management continues to press for fewer job classifications, higher 
work loads, and greater discretion in allocating human resources. Unions 
sometimes oppose these changes, in part because they remain uncon- 
vinced that the changes will lead to improved competitiveness and 
employment security. 
Our analysis suggests that it is important to distinguish between 
various types of work practices. Some practices influence the pace of 
work and the degree of discretion exercised by management, while 
others affect the degree of worker and union participation in shop floor 
decisions. Our analysis of plant-level data from one American company 
indicates that where there is less relief and idle time and more managerial 
discretion in the allocation of overtime, layoffs, and job transfers, labor 
hours and the number of supervisors per production worker are signifi- 
cantly decreased and product quality is improved. 
37. For a similar argument that effective integration of Japanese manufacturing 
practices with teamwork and worker participation in decisionmaking leads to the high 
performance of the transplants, see Haruo Shimada and John Paul MacDuffie, "Industrial 
Relations and Humanware: Japanese Investments in Auto Manufacturing in the United 
States," working paper 1855-87 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of 
Management, December 1986). 
38. Krafcik, "High Performance Manufacturing," p. 9. 
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Yet, greater use of team systems in this company has led to substan- 
tially higher labor hours and more supervisors. We found no evidence 
that plants with fewer production-worker job classifications performed 
better. The absence of positive results from adopting work teams and 
reducing production-worker job classifications was particularly striking 
in light of the fact that a number of auto and other companies have 
recently invested so much effort in shifting to these kinds of work 
practices. 
Although the use of work teams does not per se appear to increase 
productivity, our data do suggest that increased worker and union 
participation in work group and technology-related decisions has de- 
creased production costs and improved product quality. The statistical 
associations between our measures of participation and plant economic 
performance, however, remain weak. 
It is possible, of course, that the negative effects of work teams on 
plant productivity in the company we analyzed resulted from problems 
associated with introducing the system and that teams may yet help 
improve productivity (they were first introduced into this company in 
the late 1970s). Furthermore, teams do represent a significant departure 
from traditional American industrial relations practices, and their suc- 
cessful implementation may require other changes in managerial practice 
and worker attitudes that take time to accomplish. Yet it is surprising 
that even by 1986 there was no evidence of a positive return from the 
use of teams. 
Data collected by John Krafcik have showed that the labor productiv- 
ity of Japanese plants and Japanese-owned transplants operating in the 
United States is high relative to that of the average American plant. Our 
field observations of plants in Japan and of transplants suggest that 
reliance on teams and the use of fewer job classifications contributed to 
the high performance of these plants. The Japanese auto companies 
benefit from team systems because the systems are linked to decentral- 
ized manufacturing practices, a linkage missing in the American auto 
company. 
American auto companies and the UAW are counting on changes in 
work rules spurred by expanded employment security to improve 
competitiveness. If auto company managements use any new coopera- 
tive spirit on the part of the work force to introduce team work systems 
more rapidly, our data suggest the teams will be counterproductive 
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unless they promote increases in worker and union participation in shop 
floor decisions and unless they are linked to revised manufacturing 
practices. Furthermore, the data suggest that plant performance also 
can be improved by changes in work rules that increase the pace of work 
and allow greater managerial discretion in assigning work. Workers 
often find such increased managerial power distasteful, and it is possible 
that the new employment security programs at Ford and General Motors 
will reduce worker incentives to make such work rule changes. The new 
employment security programs at Ford and General Motors will prove 
extremely costly if auto workers come to believe that these programs 
insulate them from the need to improve plant productivity and to modify 
industrial relations. What appears necessary are integrated changes in 
work and manufacturing practices that increase worker participation 
and lower production costs. 
Krafcik's data suggest that the interests of the American consumer 
can be promoted by encouraging the expanded operation of Japanese- 
owned transplants. These plants have high productivity even when, as 
in the case of NUMMI, they operate with a unionized work force. 
In the face of the dramatic depreciation of the dollar against the yen 
in the past two years, the transplants likely will become important 
competitors with American auto companies. Such a challenge will make 
it even more important to understand which industrial relations practices 
contribute to the high productivity of Japanese transplants and how 
much they contribute. We also need to understand why the American 
auto company we analyzed received so little benefit from its expansion 
of team systems and reductions in job classifications. The need for more 
research is obvious. 
Appendix A: Statistical Properties of Principal Components 
Analysis 
Principal components analysis reduces the dimensionality of a data 
set of a large number of interrelated variables through the construction 
of linear combinations of the original variables that account for the 
maximum amount of total variation.39 This reduction is accomplished 
39. Principal components analysis is described in Harold Hotelling, "Analysis of a 
Complex of Variables into Principal Components," Journal of Educational Psychology. 
vol. 24 (September 1933), pp. 417-41; vol. 24(October 1933), pp. 498-520; and I. T. Jollife, 
Principal Componenr Analysis (Springer-Verlag, 1986). 
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Table A-1. Principal Component Coefficients 
Discretion and work pace Participation 
Question Teams Mandis Question Wrkgrppar Techpar 
Source: Authors' calculations from sample data 
by transforming to a new set of uncorrelated variables the principal 
components, which retain the variations present in the original data. The 
principal components are ordered so that the first few retain most of the 
variation present in all the original variables. Specifically, the first 
principal component is the unique linear combination of the original 
variables determined by a function maximizing the total amount of 
variance accounted for by one component; the second component, 
uncorrelated and orthogonal to the first, captures the maximum of the 
residual variance; and so on, until all the original variance is explained. 
The properties of orthogonality and maximization of variance uniquely 
define principal  component^.^^ The sum of the variances of all the 
principal components is equal to the sum of the variances of the original 
40. See John E. Overall and C. James Klett, Applied Multivariate Analysis (McGraw- 
Hill, 1972), p. 57. 
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variables. An assumption of normality is not made in order to use 
principal components. Since it is deviations from the norm that are of 
interest, the number of variables is reduced by discarding the linear 
combinations (components) that have small variances and no theoret- 
ical significance and then studying only those with large  variance^.^' 
Computation of principal components reduces to the solution of an 
eigenvalue-eigenvector problem for a positive semidefinite symmetric 
matrix. Table A-1 lists the sign and coefficients on the questions in the 
managerial discretion and participation components with coefficients 
greater than .45. 
Appendix B: Work Practice Survey 
D I S C R E T I O N  A N D  W O R K  P A C E  Q U E S T I O N S  
1. What percentage of hourly employees receives more relief time by 
local agreement or practice than they are entitled to by the national 
agreement? 
2. What percentage of hourly employees receives tag relief? 
3. What percentage of hourly employees has a right to earned idle 
time? 
4. What percentage of hourly employees regularly qualifies for earned 
idle time? 
5. What percentage of the time is overtime allocated by a low-man 
overtime concept? 
6. What percentage of the time is overtime allocated by a spread-in- 
hours overtime concept? 
7. During a permanent layoff, is it possible under the terms of your 
seniority agreement for more senior production workers to be on 
layoff by their own choice, while younger workers stay in the plant? 
8. How often are hourly employees allowed by your local agreement 
to make an intraplant transfer move each 12 months? 
9. What percentage of production workers is paid for the number of 
jobs they are able to perform rather than for the specific job 
performed on a given day? 
10. What percentage of production workers in a given work area is 
expected to learn the different jobs within their work area? 
41. T. W. Anderson, Anlnrroduction to Multivariate StatisticalAnalysis, 2ded. (John 
Wiley, 1984), p. 451. 
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1 1 .  What percentage of production workers is required to rotate across 
jobs in their work area sufficiently to maintain proficiency in those 
jobs? 
12. What percentage of production workers on occasion sets up and 
adjusts their machines? 
13. What percentage of production workers on occasion performs minor 
maintenance? 
14. What percentage of production workers on occasion inspects their 
own work? 
15. What percentage of production workers on occasion performs any 
necessary "repair" work on their own work? 
16. What percentage of production workers on occasion performs any 
necessary repair work on work done by others? 
17. What percentage of production workers on occasion inspects the 
work of others? 
18. What percentage of production workers on occasion performs their 
own housekeeping? 
19. What percentage of skilled, maintenance, or tooling workers regu- 
larly performs incidental tasks of other skilled trades (we mean by 
incidental tasks such things as the disconnection of hydraulic hoses, 
bracket making, or the removal of guards)? 
20. When performing an incidental task as described in question 19, 
what percentage of skilled, maintenance, or tooling workers can do 
all that is necessary to complete the job without calling in other 
trades, subject to training and safety requirements? 
21. How many separate job classifications are there for production or 
assembly workers? (Utility should be counted as one classification.) 
22. How many separate job classifications are there for nonskilled 
employees, other than production or assembly, such as material, 
unskilled maintenance, or inspectors? 
23. How many separate job classifications are there for skilled, tooling, 
or maintenance workers? 
P A R T I C I P A T I O N  Q U E S T I O N S  
24. Of those workers directly affected by new technology (new machines 
or processes), typically what percentage of those workers or their 
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elected representatives discusses the new technology with manage- 
ment before thejnal  design specijcations are decided? 
25. Of those workers directly affected by new technology (new machines 
or processes), typically what percentage of those workers or their 
elected representatives discusses with management the way jobs or 
duties will be restructured by the new technology before the jna l  
decisions are made? 
26. Of those workers directly affected by new technology (new machines 
or processes), typically what percentage of those workers or their 
elected representatives discusses the impact on newjobs or employ- 
ment levels after new technology has been selected or introduced? 
27. Of those workers directly affected by new technology (new machines 
or processes), typically what percentage of those workers or their 
elected representatives is involved in planning and coordinating 
training for employees after new technology has been introduced? 
28. What percentage of employees in a given work area certifies when 
their peers master new skill levels or job requirements? 
29. In what percentage of cases are work assignments within a given 
work area regularly made by employees (as a group) rather than by 
a supervisor? 
30. What percentage of employees in a given work area regularly 
participates in training new workers in their area? 
31. What percentage of employees in a given work area regularly 
maintains written records on quality? 
32. What percentage of employees in a given work area regularly 
maintains written records on costs? 
33. What percentage of employees in a given work area regularly 
maintains written records on productivity? 
34. What percentage of employees in a given work area regularly 
maintains written records on scrap? 
35. What percentage of employees in a given work area is involved in 
setting individual work loads? 
36. What percentage of employees has the responsibility to design, time, 
and lay out jobs in their work area? 
37. What percentage of employees has the right to stop the line or 
production process to correct a problem? 
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38. How many company-paid full-time union representatives function 
in your plant (include shop and other union committeemen, benefit 
plant reps., health and safety reps., EAP reps., attendance coordi- 
nators and counselors, training coordinators, QWL coordinators, 
and other full-time reps.)? 
39. How many salaried employees are there in the plant whoseprimary 
job is to interface on a regular basis with union reps. (include salaried 
employees such as labor reps., health and safety reps., benefit plan 
administrators, training coordinators, QWL coordinators, and 
others)? 
40. How many hours of formal orientation typically are provided new 
production employees? 
41. How many hours of formal training other than orientation are 
provided on average to new production employees? 
42. How many hours of formal training other than orientation but 
including joint training activities are provided to hourly employees 
already working in the plant on average annually? 
43. What percentage of hourly employees meets on a regular basis in 
small groups to discuss production or quality problems? 
44. What percentage of hourly employees tracks or is given statistical 
information on their work group's quality or productivity perfor- 
mance? 
45. What percentage of hourly employees' attitudes is regularly assessed 
through surveys or is discussed regularly in group meetings? 
46. What percentage of hourly employees receives formal training in 
group problem solving, decisionmaking, and communications? 
47. What percentage of hourly employees receives formal training in 
statistical process control techniques? 
48. What percentage of hourly employees regularly utilizes statistical 
process control techniques? 
Comments 
and Discussion 
Edward Lazear: Most of the discussion of productivity in recent years 
has been of the popular variety, with evidence consisting more of rumors 
than of facts. Harry Katz, Thomas Kochan, and Jeffrey Keefe provide 
the first hard empirical evidence on the effects of various industrial 
relations approaches on productivity. For this reason, the paper is both 
interesting and important. But like Marc Antony, a discussant's job is to 
bury the authors, not to praise them, and there are some ways the paper 
might be improved. 
I will comment on problems of structure, of measurement, and of 
interpretation, and on some more technical disagreements. First, the 
entire structure of the authors' approach seems unusual. The authors 
think in terms of a tension between workers and management over work 
rules and other issues. For example, they write, "We scored the work 
rules question so that management would clearly prefer a high response, 
while the work force would prefer a low response. A high response to 
work rules questions indicated either a faster pace of work or greater 
discretion exercised by management in the allocation ofjob tasks." At 
first blush, it certainly seems reasonable that workers and management 
would have differences of opinion about how hard a worker should work. 
But virtually all economic analyses that look at the interaction between 
workers and firms conclude that the firm, even in a monopsonistic 
setting, maximizes workers' welfare for a given level of profit. Stated 
alternatively, profit maximization is consistent with making the worker 
as well off as possible per dollar of profit. What is not clear from reading 
the paper is that dollars are not allowed to adjust. That is, the authors 
implicitly assume that management actions are taken without any 
adjustment in the price paid to labor. This assumption is problematic 
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because the heart of the issue is the effect of work rules on cost. Cost 
can go up either because hours used per automobile go up or because 
hours per automobile stay constant but the price paid to labor goes up. 
Workers who are forced to work in a less attractive environment must 
be compensated through higher wages. That is true even in a union 
setting, and for this reason I believe the methodology is somewhat 
flawed. This is more than amere measurement problem. By not modeling 
cost and productivity explicitly, the authors have tricked themselves 
into thinking that their dependent variables are more closely related to 
the relevant concept than they are. It is not sensible to talk about whether 
one approach to industrial relations is better than another without looking 
at the effects of that approach, effects not only on factor utilization but 
also on the prices paid for those factors. Once one does that, any tension 
between management and labor on that particular score is less viable. 
The same point is more concretely relevant in assessing their results. 
The authors find that greater managerial discretion implies higher pro- 
ductivity when measured through fewer hours. That may well be true, 
but the question is whether labor hours by themselves are relevant. They 
are certainly of interest, but they are not the whole story. If greater 
managerial discretion means more output per hour, but also means that 
management must increase compensation to labor by more than the 
savings in terms of labor hours, then one would hardly argue that giving 
greater managerial discretion is an appropriate tool for improving the 
American automobile industry's standing vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
Let me turn to a somewhat different, but also structural, problem. 
The authors are aware that there is some potential for simultaneity bias 
in almost all empirical analyses. However, awareness is not sufficient; 
bias must be addressed in a much more careful fashion. The reason is as 
follows: most of the data they have are cross-sectional. Although they 
have a panel data set, little is gained by using the panel aspects, and one 
must ask, then, why some plants use one approach to industrial relations 
while others use another. Put more concretely, the authors find that 
performance measures vary greatly by plant. Surely the company must 
be aware of some of these differences, or else one would have to claim 
that it is totally naive about the effect of industrial relations policy on 
performance or that the variations are spurious. One can interpret 
differences across plants and performance in two ways. One is that the 
firm has installed industrial relations practice in a random way and the 
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differences reflect those practices. The other is that all the relevant 
factors have not been heldconstant; the given industrial relations practice 
is the optimal one for any given plant, but labor productivity varies for 
reasons other than those observed in the data. I find the second 
explanation more plausible, especially since the variation among plants 
is probably stable over time. The authors could certainly check to see 
whether this is true. If it is stable over time, the firm should have learned 
that certain plants are more productive and have adopted the practices 
used there. 
The major measurement problem has to do with the failure to measure 
capital. A reduction in hours worked, although perhaps the best measure 
of improvement in productivity, is not sufficient. For example, suppose 
that one particular industrial relations approach creates so much tension 
between management and labor that management chooses to reduce its 
labor force dramatically and emphasize robotics to avoid conflict that 
comes from having to deal with pe~ple rather than machines. The authors 
would observe that as an improvement in productivity because labor 
hours per automobile fall, when in fact unit costs have risen. The authors 
are clearly aware of this problem, but some attempt to adjust for it might 
be important. This comes up specifically in a number of contexts. One 
of their dependent variables for measuring productivity is the number of 
supervisors. If supervisors increase but workers decrease sufficiently, 
unit costs could have gone down. This is the equivalent of not holding 
capital constant-in this case the capital is supervisory capital. They 
also use grievances per hundred workers as a measure of labor-manage- 
ment conflict. One way to reduce grievances is to fire those workers who 
make the most trouble or somehow induce them to leave. Such a policy 
could reduce grievances per hundred workers but might increase unit 
costs. 
Measurement problems also come up in the context of the authors' 
test for efficient wages. Although some models, namely those that result 
in markets that do not clear, require that the wage at one plant be higher 
than the wage in the community as a whole, other models that provide 
for increases in effort do not require higher wages. Rather, they require 
that the age-earnings profile be steeper but that the average level of 
wages can be the same as elsewhere. Specifically, my mandatory 
retirement model argues that workers are paid less than they are worth 
when they are young and more than they are worth when they are old as 
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an incentive mechanism. This could very well leave the average wage at 
the firm equal to the average wage in the community, but slopes would 
be different. It would be interesting to see whether the slope of the age- 
earnings profile, rather than the difference between wage at the firm and 
wage elsewhere, has an effect on the measures of productivity. 
A final measurement problem concerns the accounting data by John 
Krafcik that the authors cite. Many years ago, Milton Friedman pointed 
out that accounting data, appropriately compiled, will attach value to 
specific resources that make a firm more productive. For example, a 
farm located on better land should account for the rental price of the 
land at a higher rate than a farm located on poor land. In the limit, if 
factors are priced appropriately, accounting profits at all firms must be 
the same. Thus if different countries use different methods for evaluating 
specific resources, accounting data will have little validity in terms of 
real unit cost. 
As for interpretation, the first difficulty concerns the principal com- 
ponents method. I find the names associated with the variables that the 
authors construct somewhat problematic. They would like to interpret 
RULES 1, for example, as teams by looking at the component loadings 
important in constructing that variable. Although this may be all right 
for some purposes, a better approach would be to include the variables 
that seem to count most directly in the regression and leave the others 
out. Researchers must, of course, choose which variables to include and 
which to exclude. For example, labor economists generally put WAGES 
as the dependent variable and do not create some variable called 
COMPENSATION that is a blend of wages, vacation time, pension 
benefits, and so forth. The reason is that most researchers believe the 
pecuniary component is the most important. Similarly, the authors 
should confine their attention to the more straightforward empirical 
approach. They report these more traditional regressions in the analysis, 
and I wish they would emphasize them to a greater extent than the 
principal components approach. 
A second problem of interpretation has to do with the findings that a 
higher wage is associated with more supervision. There are a number of 
ways to interpret this finding. One is that workers must be compensated 
more if they work under closer supervision. Another is that the super- 
visor's wages are included in the average plant wage. Since supervisors 
earn more than workers, higher plant wages might reflect more super- 
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vision. My guess is that WAGE excludes the wages of supervisors, but 
this is not made clear in the paper. Even if that is not true, however, it is 
certainly the case that the age structure of the firm would affect the 
average wage, and I do not believe that structure was held constant in 
the appropriate way. 
Another difficulty of interpretation has to do with the number of jobs 
learned by a particular worker. The authors assume management likes 
employees to be flexible and that workers do not. Again, if compensation 
is allowed to vary, the reverse may be true. Management might prefer 
workers to specialize in a certain task (along the lines of Adam Smith), 
whereas workers might prefer to learn a large number of jobs so that 
they would be better prepared if their current job situation were to 
change. 
Let me conclude with a couple of technical points. First, when I saw 
that the data set was a panel, I thought that surely the authors would 
exploit the within-plant variation over time to obtain their results. 
Unfortunately, they spent very little time doing that, perhaps because 
the results were so disappointing. Most of their results come from 
analysis of cross-sectional variation rather than time-series variation for 
a given plant. Cross-plant variation may pick up too many other things. 
In the same vein, one would expect that productivity changes would 
differ depending on whether the institution of a particular industrial 
relations practice was anticipated or unanticipated. Anticipated changes 
mean that the firm is able to adjust capital, supervision, and other 
aspects; and labor is able to adjust in terms of demands for compensation 
and other work conditions. Again, I hoped that the time-series analysis 
might prove fruitful here. 
In sum, there are a large number of potential difficulties with this 
paper. But the same can be said of almost any good empirical work. 
Katz, Kochan, and Keefe have taken a bold step toward providing us 
with some solid evidence on the effect of industrial relations practices 
on productivity. Despite some negative reactions, I find it the best 
available empirical work on the subject. 
George C. Eads: This paper is an interesting effort to bring insights 
from the field of industrial relations to bear on the major changes taking 
place in American manufacturing. It seeks to answer the question, what 
effects are work rule changes having on economic performance? In 
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particular, are work practices such as numerous job classifications "to 
blame" (the authors' words) for poor American productivity? Have the 
recent changes in work rules adopted in some American plants produced 
significant payoffs? If so, which changes have produced the largest 
improvements in performance? 
To answer these questions the authors employ data from a major U.S. 
auto company, covering fifty-three plants in 1979 and 1986. The plants 
were engaged in a variety of operations, including the final assembly of 
vehicles, stamping, body fabrication, engine assembly, and the manu- 
facturing of components. However, the authors make the most use of 
data on assembly plants. Indeed, though they do not say so specifically, 
one must assume that two of their four sets of estimated equations (the 
results reported in tables 2 through 5) use data only from assembly plants 
since the dependent variables in the equations make sense only for such 
plants. 
The authors also review preliminary results from a study by John 
Krafcik, which is based on detailed investigation of manufacturing 
practices employed in thirty-eight assembly plants in thirteen countries.' 
Though Krafcik's work is not focused on labor relations practices to the 
extent this paper is, it does address many of the same questions. In 
preparing these comments, I have used both the version of the Krafcik 
paper to which the authors refer and a later version employing a 
somewhat larger and richer sample. Krafcik stresses that these later data 
should be considered as still preliminary. The authors' principal finding 
is essentially that team systems of production do not significantly 
improve auto industry productivity. This finding runs counter to the 
beliefs of many, including many in my own company, and also counter 
to Krafcik's preliminary results. 
The authors' primary support is the statistically significant positive 
association they find in one of their four sets of equations (the one whose 
results are reported in table 3) between the variable Teams and the 
number of labor hours unadjusted for vehicle complexity that are 
required to assemble a car. They conclude that an increase of one 
standard deviation in Teams is associated with 7 hours and 28 minutes 
1 .  John F. Krafcik, "Comparative Analysis of Performance Indicators at World Auto 
Assembly Plants" (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, Sloan School of Management, 
January 1988). 
722 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1987 
more assembly labor hours compared with the manufacturer's 1986 
average of 32.73 labor hours. The authors do not actually measure 
whether a plant employs production teams. Instead, as they state in the 
section titled "Reducing the Dimensionality of the Survey Responses," 
Teams is a composite variable consisting of "questions with [factor] 
component loadings greater than 0.45 in the first component measure 
rules that are associated with team work systems. . . ." Thus it seems 
inappropriate for them to characterize their results, which turn out to be 
statistically weak in any event, as suggesting what might or might not 
occur in plants that employ true team systems, the sort of situation that 
Krafcik in fact examined. 
However, I would not want this disagreement to be misinterpreted. 
While the authors' econometric results, especially their results concern- 
ing teams, do  not seem to stand up to scrutiny, I agree completely with 
their conclusion that an effective linking of labor relations practices with 
management practices is the key to achieving superior productivity. This 
is completely consistent with Krafcik's findings. He reports a positive 
correiation between productivity (adjusted for vehicle complexity) and 
a variable he labels management philosophy, one element of which is 
the use of team  system^.^ 
My own view is that changes in work rules or the introduction of team 
systems are by themselves likely to accomplish very little. My staff has 
conducted detailed documentation of the team-based manufacturing 
practices employed at the GM-Toyota joint venture known as NUMMI.4 
2. Krafcik gwes a plant in his sample full credit for using teams only if it has used "a 
team-style organization for at least one year," the one year cutoff sewing "to differentiate 
between those plants which have just started using a team-style organization and are 
therefore still in a transition phase and those plants with more established team organiza- 
tions." A plant also is credited with using teams only if "each team has a team leader, who 
has the capability of performing production work" (p. 29). 
3. Ibid., pp. 78-83. Katz, Lochan, and Keefe seem to go to unnecessary lengths to 
criticize Krafcik'sresults, commentingadversely on thequality ofcertainofthe corrections 
that he had to make and indicating that the sample size might be too small to yield definite 
results concerning teams. In my opinion, Krafcik has done a careful job of collecting his 
data and purging it of extraneous influences. The information content of his individual data 
points seems high, and his results both internally consistent and highly plausible. 
4. General Motors Economics Staff, NUMMI Management Practices, January 1987. 
This study, which was undertaken to understand the reasons for NUMMI's superior 
productivity and quality performance, was coordinated by GM Economics Staff and 
conducted by a multistaffteam including representatives from NUMMI, the GM Technical 
Liaison Office at NUMMI'9 Fremont plant, GM's two car groups, many other corporate 
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It also has conducted cross-firm studies involving similar products 
produced by GM plants and by plants of its principal domestic and 
foreign  competitor^.^ (Using similar products obviates the need to adjust 
for product complexity, the adjustment that bedevils Katz, Kochan, and 
Keefe.) This latter work found that team systems are not uniform either 
in structure or e f f e ~ t . ~  Some plants were able to achieve productivity 
levels nearly as good as NUMMI's without the use of teams. In other 
plants, the use of teams did not seem to improve productivity. (I am 
unaware of any documented case in which teams have impeded produc- 
tivity, the result that Katz, Kochan and Keefe report.) 
What the studies find is that, when used as part of a well-defined and 
internally consistent manufacturing system, a properly structured team 
system can be apowerful force for increasing productivity and improving 
product quality. But a crucial requirement for making team systems pay 
staffs, and the UAW. The study has important competitive implications and so has not 
been made available to the public. 
The methodology employed was similar to that Krafcik used. Members of the study 
team visited NUMMI and the GM Technical Liaison Office several times, conducting 
many interviews with NUMMI and GM personnel. They also visited several of NUMMI's 
suppliers to discuss their relationship with NUMMI, interviewed GM experts on Japanese 
manufacturing techniques, studied NUMMI materials, and read a variety of articles and 
books on NUMMI and on the Toyota production system on which NUMMI's system is 
based. Employees at the Technical Liaison Office and NUMMI managers commented 
extensively on drafts of the report. 
To contrast NUMMI practices with those of GM, team members interviewed GM 
executives and visitedGM assembly and component plants. At the plants, top management, 
first-line supervisors, and hourly workers were interviewed to get as many perspectives 
on GM as possible. Because practices at GM vary from group to group, division to division, 
and plant to plant, most comparisons to GM were based on what the team determined to 
be typical GM practice and are not specific to any GM facility. 
The study yielded other quantitative and qualitative results. The former are reported 
in tabular form. No effort was made to utilize multiple regression techniques. 
5. General Motors Truck and Bus Group, Truck Manufacturing Practices Study, 
August 1987. This study, which is also proprietary, was coordinated by GM Economics 
StafT and conducted principally by Truck and Bus Group staff and GM Economics Staff. 
It followed the NUMMI study, and there was some overlap in the two study teams. The 
Truck Manufcturing Practices Study focused on a single kind of light truck produced by 
both GM and its principal domestic and overseas competitors; it sought to explain major 
productivity differences observed across both the GM facilities producing the product and 
plants of GM's competitors. 
6. Some of the GM facilities studied used forms of team systems, though in no case 
were these teams used in the way NUMMI's teams were. Some of the relatively more 
productive facilities of GM's competitors used teams and some did not. 
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off significantly is that management practices, as well as other important 
labor relations practices such as policies concerning layoffs, be changed. 
All team systems are not alike, and differences in team size and the 
degree of autonomy given teams can produce important differences in 
results. For example, teams at NUMMI consist of four to six workers 
as opposed to teams of fifteen to twenty at two GM facilities. Rotation 
is mandatory at NUMMI while GM relies primarily on voluntary rotation. 
What makes NUMMI's team systems different is what the company 
calls standardized work, in which each job is documented in detail. All 
workers must perform eachjob in exactly the same manner: no individual 
differences are allowed. This description makes NUMMI sound like an 
extremely rigid system, one that Katz, Kochan, and Keefe would 
consider favorable to management. But something quite different is 
involved. In fact, at NUMMI the workers develop their own work rules. 
(To do this, formal work rules must be few and job classifications very 
flexible.) If a worker thinks he has a better way to do a job, he must 
convince the team to adopt his method. Job documentation is continually 
revised based on suggestions. As efficiency is increased, slack is con- 
centrated in one job per team. Mandatory rotation ensures that every 
worker regularly gets the job with slack time. By concentrating slack 
into one job per team, productivity improvements become visible to 
both team members and management. As more slack develops, the line 
is rebalanced among teams, and labor is removed from the line.' 
The differences in team sizes between NUMMI and other GM plants 
employing team systems raise a question about one of the authors' 
dependent variables-the number of first-line supervisors per one hundred 
production workers. They intepret a lower value of this variable as  being 
associated with better performance. But is it? Our experience suggests 
that it is difficult in team systems, especially as  employed at NUMMI, 
to identify just who is a first-line supervisor. The team leader at NUMMI 
is an hourly worker but performs important supervisory functions. If the 
team leader is considered a first-line supervisor, the ratio of such 
supervisors to production workers is 1 to 5 at NUMMI, much higher 
than would be the average for other GM plants (even plants that also 
employ teams). Yet I certainly would not conclude that NUMMI was 
7. This rebalancing and removal oflabor from the line does not lead tolayoffs. NUMMI 
is committed to maintainingemployment in the plant except inextraordinary circumstances 
and has done so in the face of major cutbacks in demand for its products. 
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performing poorly because of this. Consider also the matter of adjusting 
assembly hours per vehicle for differences in vehicle complexity. The 
authors do this in the regressions whose results are reported in table 4. 
But they do not do so in the critical table 3  regression^.^ They justify this 
omission by expressing concern about the validity of the way the 
company whose plants they surveyed corrected for vehicle complexity. 
Based on their description of this correction method, I share their 
concerns. But the solution is not to avoid correction altogether. That 
implies that, all else held equal, a complex car such as the Cadillac 
Seville should take the same number of hours to assemble as a relatively 
low-content Chevrolet Cavalier. This is obviously incorrect, and the 
failure to make some sort of adjustment for complexity renders the table 
3 results highly suspect. 
Finally, this paper reflects an increasingly outdated mind set. It 
embodies the adversarial tradition that historically has characterized 
American labor-management relations. This is explicit even in the way 
the variables are constructed. The authors divide them into those 
"favorable to management" and those "favorable to labor." What we 
in the auto industry are learning is that this sort of adversarial thinking 
will no longer work. GM's recent agreement with the UAW, as well as 
what has been learned from NUMMI and other examples, should be 
interpreted in that light. If we are to compete successfully with the 
transplant facilities that are springing up throughout North America, not 
to speak of the facilities that are being built elsewhere around the globe, 
we must change both our industrial relations practices and our manage- 
ment practices. Team systems are likely to be an important part of this 
change. But by themselves they willaccomplishlittle. The Katz, Kochan, 
and Keefe paper performs an important service by emphasizing that 
fact. 
General Discussion 
The authors and other participants agreed that the most surprising 
result of the study was the failure to find evidence that the use of teams 
contributes to plant productivity. Harry Katz suggested that this failure 
8. To repeat, this is the only set of equations in which the Teams variable is statistically 
significant. 
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may be a consequence of the particular way the use of teams was 
identified and measured-in effect, a team structure was inferred from 
the presence of certain work practices and work rules. This approach 
was limiting, the authors conceded, adding that their results must be 
interpreted in that light. 
Kim Clark suggested that a straightforward way to interpret the 
authors' results would be to take seriously the implication that, in fact, 
teams do not improve performance, at least teams as they are implicitly 
defined by the authors' methodology. Rather, he suggested, what really 
matters may be the effects of worker participation and the integration of 
the people into the production process-both of which could be achieved 
with different work structures. One way to test this might be for the 
authors to decide more specifically what they think a team system is and 
then split the sample into those plants with teams and those without. He 
also suggested that the use of team systems may have a more important 
influence in dimensions of quality not picked up in the data, such as the 
ability of the plant to adapt to change or respond to unexpected events. 
Similarly, Thomas Kochan noted that related work by John Krafcik 
attempted to measure notjust the presence of teams, but how well teams 
are integrated into the manufacturing process. The degree of integration, 
Kochan added, is critical to understanding the role of teams. But he 
doubted that companies are systematic in integrating their choices of 
technology or other aspects of their production process with their human 
resource management. Some plants have made massive investments in 
technology without fundamentally altering their labor force or their 
labor-management relations, while others have made moderate changes 
and still others have made major changes. 
Katharine Abraham took issue with Edward Lazear's argument that 
a reduction in the number of labor hours required per automobile might 
not constitute an improvement in productivity because it may involve a 
cost trade-off somewhere else, perhaps, for example, in higher wages. 
Since this study involved plants from a single firm, she pointed out, 
wages were uniform among the plants in the sample, so that a reduction 
in labor hours clearly represented a decline in labor cost. Lazear 
responded that the "wage," even if uniform across plants, is affected by 
average hours. A change in hours may affect the average wage paid 
within the firm. Additionally, the reported wage is likely to be some 
aggregate of the wages of various worker types, which would reinforce 
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the validity of the point. Paul Joskow was puzzled by the evidence of 
significant and persistent productivity differences among plants in the 
same firm and suggested that the study would be illuminated by some 
discussion of how work rules are chosen, and how they are diffused 
among plants within the firm. 
Robert Crandall raised questions about the heterogeneity of the 
sample, noting that the choice of technology in a plant might be 
endogenous with respect to labor-market conditions and therefore 
correlated with some of the explanatory variables. Since the type and 
quantity of capital used in the plant would also affect the measures of 
productivity used as dependent variables, this would confound the 
reported results. He also noted that the study failed to control for 
variations in the quality of the labor force. Katz noted that labor-quality 
measures exist, but were not made available to the researchers, so that 
this adjustment could not be made. 
